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SEX AND CAPITAL: WHAT THEY TELL US
ABOUT OURSELVES
CLAIRE MOORE DICKERSONt
INTRODUCTION
In developing economies,1  the public corporation is
principally a vehicle for privatization, rather than a means of
raising capital.2 Thus, a public corporations' significance in those
t Professor of Law and Arthur L. Dickson Scholar, Rutgers Law School -
Newark; Wellesley College, A.B., Columbia University, J.D., New York University,
LL.M. in Taxation. My thanks to Gregory A. Mark, to the participants at St. John's
University School of Law's conference on "People of Color, Women, and the Public
Corporation," to Temple Law School's workshop, and to the Dean's Research Fund at
Rutgers Law School - Newark.
1 The definition of development is not simple. Consider the assertion of Jeffrey
Sachs and his co-authors stating that development can be measured by analyzing a
combination of gross national income (the World Bank's replacement for gross
domestic product), average annual growth in gross domestic product per capita, life
expectancy at birth, under-five mortality rate, and the annual growth of the
population. See Jeffrey Sachs, John W. MacArthur, Guido Schmidt-Traub, Margaret
Kruk, Chandrika Bahadur, Michael Faye & Gordon McCord, Ending Africa's Poverty
Trap, 2004 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 117, 118 (2004) (selecting certain
indicators of development). On the other hand, Amartya Sen speaks of development
in terms of human capability. The goal under this view is to achieve a society where
people can live the life they would plan for themselves. Importantly, the question is
not whether the individual in fact so functions; rather, the issue is whether he or she
has the choice to do so. See AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT
30-31 (1982) (discussing capability as the ability to function as the individual
wishes). For others, the right to development focuses on the rights of states, with a
strong sense that each state has the right to determine its own meaning of
development. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Right to Development, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 1177, 1182-83 (Mohammed
Bedjaoui ed., 1991) (describing the right to development in the context of the right of
a state as against other states). Because this Article focuses on business aspects,
development can mean all of these things; our focus is on the contribution to be
derived from supporting the entrepreneurial efforts of women, the preservation of
national patrimony, and the reduction of political corruption.
2 See Kathryn C. Lavelle, Architecture of Equity Markets: The Abidjan Regional
Bourse, 55 INT'L ORG. 717, 719-26 (2001) (discussing states in emerging markets
and their use of local, "peripheral" exchanges as vehicles for privatization, not for
corporate capital-raising); infra Parts I.B & II.B (comparing public markets in West
Africa and those in developed countries, particularly the United States).
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economies is different from what we in the North have learned to
expect from our own local experience. 3 Two critical consequences
for women in emerging markets flow from this fact. First,
entrepreneurship based on private-source capital is central to the
lives of many businesswomen. Second, because women
entrepreneurs often are both owner and employee in their own
businesses, 4 the owner-employee distinction is blurred. Indeed,
women entrepreneurs' networks emphasize class-based
differences. 5 Comparative analysis of these realities offers us in
the developed world a fresh perspective on public corporations,
on women in business, and on how they interact with each other
and in the context of the larger society.6
First, I will focus on perceptions within the developing world,
and in West Africa specifically. In that context, I will explore the
emerging classes of women entrepreneurs in that part of the
world, focusing on how they raise capital and perform business,
that is, how they perform the role of the developed-world public
corporation. Next, I will sketch out the role of the public
corporation in West Africa-if women entrepreneurs have to
source capital by other means, of what use are public
corporations? What is the significance of corporate governance to
the developing-world reality that relegates public corporations to
the role of political tool?
Against this backdrop, we look at the United States. Using
the West African experience as counterpoint, the comparative
3 See generally COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART
AND EMERGING RESEARCH (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy
Wymeersch & Stefan Prigge, eds., 1998) (revealing that academics in the U.S. look
at developments in Germany, the U.K., and Japan, and their academics look back at
us; we do not take ourselves out of our own economically developed milieu).
4 See generally Jean-Pierre Lachaud, Le Secteur Informel Urbain et
L'informatisation du Travail en Afrique: Rhdtorique et Rgalitds. Le Cas de la C6te
d'Ivoire (1995), available at http://ced.u-bordeaux4.fr/ceddt5.pdf (antedating the
2002 civil unrest, reporting that in urban C6te d'Ivoire, family-based
entrepreneurship provides revenues for most workers; the great majority of workers,
and of women in particular, are in the informal economy and thus very far from
public-market capital; and there are relatively few large "modern" businesses as the
economy becomes increasingly informal).
5 See infra Part L.A (discussing class structure of women's networks in West
Africa).
6 See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era
of Information, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 230-50, 256-75, 282-83 (1999) (discussing
classical and less traditional reasons for studying comparative law, and encouraging
an approach that combines an open mind and humility).
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analysis offers a new, class-based perspective on the roles of
women in the commercial arena. Next, I will show that although
U.S. public corporations have evolved into vehicles to maximize
shareholder wealth, the comparative analysis emphasizes that
our society need not limit itself to this view. In the wake of
massive scandals such as the Enron and WorldCom debacles, we
have watched our federal and state governments wrestle with
issues relating to the governance of public corporations. The
West African understanding of governance takes the issue out of
its narrow, corporate-commercial box and places it squarely in
the larger, socio-political context. This analysis focuses our
attention where it should be: on us, the social and political actors
within the affected community.
I. THE DEVELOPING WORLD: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
A. Women Entrepreneurs: The Class Structure
There are two classes of women entrepreneurs in West
Africa.7 One class is traditional to the region; the other has
emerged more recently.8  There are both similarities and
differences between those classes: as entrepreneurs, the women
in both classes are by definition innovative and effective in
organizing their commercial ventures, 9 but they differ in their
education, in their geographic reach, and even in the products
and services they provide.
The women who run the smaller enterprises tend to sell
products that are traditionally connected to their family
obligations such as food and crafts. These women typically work
in the informal market and often are illiterate. The traditional
women entrepreneurs' supply networks cross national borders
within the region, and are built on a broad range of familial
7 This statement has the respectability of any generalization backed by
evidence. See, e.g., Anita Spring, Gender and the Range of Entrepreneurial
Strategies: The Typical and the New Woman Entrepreneur, in BLACK BUSINESS AND
ECONOMIC POWER 381, 382-83 (Alusine Jalloh & Toyin Falola eds., 2002)
(discussing the "traditional" and "new" classes of women entrepreneurs in Africa).
8 See id.
9 See Peggy Brizinski & Linda Jaine, Native Women as Entrepreneurs, in
WOMEN, FEMINISM AND DEVELOPMENT/FEMMES, FPMINISME ET D9VELOPPEMENT
378, 382 (Huguette Dagenais & Denise Pich6 eds., 1994) (defining "entrepreneur" to
"describe innovation and effective organization in family and community work").
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relationships, including kinship. 10
For these traditional businesses, there is also a more
negative narrative about the impact of social norms. Even at
home, the women appear to operate in a kind of informal,
transgressive manner. For example, they reportedly often have
to hide earnings from spouses in order to feed the family.11 Nor
do the much-touted benefits of microfinance free the women from
living the subtext. Despite all the descriptions of successful
businesses launched through micro-loans extended by the
Grameen Bank and its knock-offs, 12 this other story is grim. The
reason male-dominated banks lend to women is not because of
women's empowerment or because of assistance targeting needy
children, but rather because women are simply deemed more
compliant than men.1 3 Thus, it is a narrative of male relatives
instructing the women to borrow from the bank and funnel the
10 See Lila E. Engberg, Susan A. Beckerson & Edith Frangois, Women and
Household Production: An Ecosystem Perspective with a Comparison of Two Studiesfrom Africa, in WOMEN, FEMINISM AND DEVELOPMENT/FEMMES, FI MINISME ET
DItVELOPPEMENT, supra note 9, at 152, 154-57 (describing the importance of kinship
networks, the role of women within them, including the concerning trade in food,
and the inadequacy of male-dominated states' efforts to support the women's efforts).
There appears to be a contrast with male entrepreneurs here. See DAVID S. FICK,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AFRICA: A STUDY OF SUCCESS 21 (2002) (depicting Nigeria
and local entrepreneurs); see also Engberg, Beckerson & Frangois, supra, at 154-57;
Anita Spring & Barbara E. McDade, Entrepreneurship in Africa: Traditional and
Contemporary Paradigms, in AFRICAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND REALITY 1,
20-21 (Anita Spring & Barbara E. McDade eds., 1998) (describing the women's
greater difficulty in raising capital and in finding time away from domestic
obligations). But see Yvette Monga, A Historical Perspective on African
Entrepreneurship: Lessons from the Duala Experience in Cameroon, in AFRICAN
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND REALITY, supra, at 169, 177 (emphasizing that
the kinship networks are not necessarily explained by "cultural generalizations" but
may, instead, be analogous to immigrant networks in other countries). "Duala" is an
alternate (English) spelling for "Douala," the commercial capital of Cameroon.
With respect to the informal market, in C6te d'Ivoire, for example, the bulk of
that market, 71%, is projected to stay at a subsistence level; 30% of these businesses
are headed by women. See Lachaud, supra note 4, at 8-9 (discussing the Ivorian
informal economy prior to the 2002 civil war).
11 See, e.g., Spring, supra note 7, at 382 (describing traditional wives' tendency
to hide revenues and assets in order to avoid harassment).
12 See FICK, supra note 10, at 42 (describing a woman entrepreneur's restaurant
in Bukina-Faso, launched on the proceeds of microloans); see also Grameen: Banking
for the Poor, http://www.grameen-info.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (detailing the
offering of micro-loans).
13 See AMINUR RAHMAN, WOMEN AND MICROCREDIT IN RURAL BANGLADESH
73-74 (1999).
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loan proceeds to the male leaders of the family.14 Further, the
entrepreneurial work of these women is in addition to their
domestic obligations, resulting in the second shift familiar to
developed-country women. 15  The manifestation in the
developing-country context, however, has particular urgency
given the subsistence level of the family's existence.
16
The other class of woman entrepreneur, the new category,
features women who tend to have university education and often
possess overseas employment experience. These are the women
in charge of larger enterprises, and their businesses are involved
in many different industries, from telecommunications to
manufacturing to tourism. These entrepreneurs' products and
services cross borders in a new way. Not lirrited to family and
kinship networks, the "new" businesswomen are deep in the
globalized economy.' 7
What we find, then, is that these new entrepreneurs belong
to a favored class and deal in goods and services that might be
called gender neutral-or even traditionally male.'8  Arguably,
these women are un-gendered by their privilege and their
14 See id. at 76 (providing a subtext to the classic micro-loan narrative).
15 See Claire C. Robertson, Women Entrepreneurs? Trade and the Gender
Division of Labor in Nairobi, in AFRICAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND
REALITY, supra note 10, at 109, 122-23.
16 See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 239-45 (1989) (describing the professional
and domestic obligations of modern women in the United States); Engberg,
Beckerson & Franqois, supra note 10, at 162-68 (describing the allocation of work
between men and women); Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate
Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future Human Capital During
Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1268-69 (2004) (providing a personal
vignette into the "second shift" in the contemporary United States). However, some
of it is cultural. See generally RAHMAN, supra note 13; Engberg, Beckerson &
Franqois, supra note 10, at 162-68 (describing the allocation of work between men
and women).
17 See Spring, supra note 7, at 383 (discussing the new women entrepreneurs in
Africa). Sources of capital remain a difficult problem, solved partly by formal
banking arrangements, but also by marshalling traditional networks built on
kinship and the like. See id. at 387-88 (indicating women tend to have "less start-up
and operating capital" and "rely on their spouses and relatives for start-up capital,"
or they participate in rotating savings and credit associations in which a group of
women contribute, and each week a different participant is awarded the entire pot);
see also Akanmu G. Adebayo, Money, Credit and Banking in Colonial and Post
Colonial West Africa, in BLACK BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC POWER, supra note 7, at
147, 158-59, 166 (noting that traditional capital-sourcing systems persist in
anglophone West Africa).
18 See Robertson, supra note 15, at 110.
SEX AND CAPITAL 11652005]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
activities, at least in the professional arena.
I limit the assertion about un-gendering to professional life
because even these women are stretched across the work-family
divide. A snippet from a conversation with two Cameroonian
women reflects the dual responsibilities that the "new"
businesswomen, too, must shoulder. One of my interlocutors was
Maitre Mandessi-Bell, a very entrepreneurial and successful
lawyer. On her own, she has launched and maintains a website
that provides free updates on the new, regional business laws
applicable throughout most of non-anglophone West Africa. 19 In
her entrepreneurial mode, she is advertising very much in the
same way that lawyers in the United States and Europe do.
Given the unreliable Internet connectivity within Cameroon, she
cannot expect to reach a wide public. Instead, she is addressing
the major domestic investors (they are most likely to have a
satellite feed), and the foreign developed-world investors (they
have no connectivity problems). Maitre Mandessi-Bell is a highly
effective and thoroughly impressive individual.
The other Cameroonian present was a young woman
(probably in her early twenties), in the process of completing her
law degree, with an undergraduate degree in the French
educational system. After some prefatory shop-talk, Maitre
Mandessi-Bell turned the conversation to the harsh realities for
women in the law. She advised the younger woman to plan
carefully on how to balance her chosen profession and the
demands of a future household. The law student responded
pragmatically about the constraining impact of the stuttering
economy on any possibilities of advancement in any niche of the
profession, even before factoring in the issue of balancing home
and professional life. And then she proceeded to expand on the
difficulties that she foresees because of her gender.20  This
conversation, held in Douala, Cameroon while casually waiting
for a taxi, is deeply familiar to developed-world women
professionals of my generation.
Whatever the difficulties the elite women face, their realities
are in important ways profoundly different in degree from those
confronting the traditional women entrepreneurs. A Ghanaian
19 See Interview with Maitre Evelyne Mandessi-Bell in Douala, Cameroon (July
3, 2005).
20 See id.; Interview with Mlle. Z.U. in Douala, Cameroon (July 3, 2005)
(anonymity to protect interviewee).
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"new" entrepreneur used her retirement bonus from a nursing
career in England and arbitraged it into a successful tuna-fishing
operation in Ghana. She now supplies a U.S.-controlled canning
operation.21 A Senegalese fashion-designer, together with her
French husband, launched a successful event-production
company and Internet caf6 in Dakar. 22 Another anecdote about
an elite entrepreneur features a U.S.-born woman who, with her
Ghanaian husband, founded car-rental and tour businesses in
Ghana. This businesswoman was brought up in the United
States, and received both her university education and early
employment experience entirely in the United States. She has
energized the Ghanaian tourist industry, and her tour company
is today one of the most successful in that country. 23  To
summarize, the first of these women is native to West Africa but
spent her career in England; the second is Senegalese but
established her businesses together with her French husband;
the third was born and raised in the United States, and manages
companies she founded with her husband. These anecdotes
suggest that the successful new entrepreneurs do benefit from
direct or indirect exposure to northern business practices, and
that their husbands are useful, too. At the most concrete level,
the spouses are an additional source of or conduit to capital. 24
Perhaps the most energizing story is that of the Ghanaian
Lucia Quachey. She began a clothing manufacturing business
out of her house over thirty-five years ago, and now owns and
manages a factory. She has also founded a Ghanaian
organization to foster women entrepreneurs, and is a leader in a
similar pan-African organization. Her Ghanaian association
boasts a membership of 650 companies that cut across the
boundary between traditional and "new" women entrepreneurs. 25
21 See FICK, supra note 10, at 36.
22 See id. at 44.
23 See id. at 27-28.
24 See Spring, supra note 7, at 388-89 (stating that the "new" businesswoman
may have access to family money, or to capital through family connections).
Depending on the definition of indigenous, there are other relevant, non-indigenous
sources of expertise and capital in West Africa besides the North. In C6te d'Ivoire,
for example, second and third-generation Lebanese "control more than [50%] of the
economic activities." FICK, supra note 10, at 40. For a general discussion of minority
ethnic groups in the developing world, see Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and
Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1
(1998).
25 FICK, supra note 10, at 33-35 (reporting that represented industries of Ghana
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In West Africa, then, women entrepreneurs fall into two
classes. The products and territories are different, as are the
education levels of the businesswomen. However, there also are
similarities across the classes. Even beyond the start-up phase,
both classes use sources of capital other than the public markets,
and both are subject to social pressures. Currently, elite
businesswomen are including the traditional entrepreneurs in
their efforts to reform the structures affecting women in
business.26
B. Public Corporations in the Developing World
1. West African Public Corporations Are Privatization Tools
Public corporations in the developing world are unusual to
the northern eye. In the North, we understand public
corporations to be those whose shares are traded on a national or
regional exchange, or over the counter. Applying that definition
to the developing world,27 we do find a few such corporations. In
West Africa, for example, the regional exchange located in
Abidjan, CMte d'Ivoire, lists forty companies. 28 In comparison, the
New York Stock Exchange lists some 2,800 companies, and
Euronext lists 1,333.29 West African public corporations, the
Association of Women Entrepreneurs ("GAWE") and African Federation of Women
Entrepreneurs ("AFWE") include food processing, day-care centers, crafts,
pharmaceuticals, and hotels); see also Spring, supra note 7 (reporting conversations
with Quachey).
26 See generally FICK, supra note 10.
27 The relevant countries, including Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, are
all on the World Bank's list of "low-income economies." The other categories are
'lower-middle income," "upper-middle income," and "high income economies." See
World Bank Group, Data and Statistics: Country Classification: Country Groups,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2005).
28 All but one are Ivorian; the outlier is Senegalese. For a description of the
Bourse R~gionale des Valeurs Mobili~res ("BRVM"), see MBendi, Bourse Regionale
des Valeurs Mobilieres, http://www.mbendi.co.za/exch/25/p0005.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2005) (stating that it serves eight countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, C6te
d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo).
29 See Euronext, Chiffres Cls, available at http://www.euronext.com/editorial/
anchors/wide/0,5371,1679378742,00.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2005); N.Y. Stock
Exch., Listed Company Directory, available at http://www.nyse.com/about/
listed/listed.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). Euronext is the result of the merger of
the Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris stock exchanges, which the Portuguese
exchange and London International Financial Futures Exchange ("LIFFE") later
joined. See Euronext, Regulatory Structure, available at http://www.euronext.com/
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most formal denizens of the formal economy, are unlikely to
increase rapidly in number given the importance and extent of
the region's informal economy. Since business people in the
informal economy tend not to pay taxes, they are unlikely to
want to tell the government of their activities. Thus, they are
unlikely to choose to file formal organizational papers, let alone
list on an exchange, even if they can afford the cost.30 In West
Africa, the businesses that do register tend to take a form that
inevitably is privately held. 31 Public corporations not only are
unusual, but they are likely to remain so for the foreseeable
future.
The second reality about public corporations in developing
countries, and in West Africa in particular, is that they exist as a
privatization tool. 32 A government may seek to privatize its
utilities or other nationalized businesses by conviction, or due to
conditions imposed by an international financial institution such
as the World Bank.3 3 In either case, the government is using the
local stock market to make some portion of the formerly
parastatal organization available to the local population.34
When choosing to privatize a business, the government must
find a purchaser with sufficient capital, and buyers in the public
market are only one potential source. The government could,
instead, seek out a juridical or natural person with assets
available to purchase the parastatal; in most cases the likely
source of capital for such a purchase is a foreign multinational
editorial/wide/0,5371,1732_4528690,00.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
30 For example, there is a vibrant informal market in the C6te d'Ivoire. See
Lachaud, supra note 4 (describing the C6te d'Ivoire's informal economies and their
increasing size); see also HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 85 (2000)
(discussing extralegal sectors outside West Africa); Katharina Pistor & Daniel
Berkowitz, Of Legal Transplants, Legal Irritants, and Economic Development, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 347, 352
(Peter K. Cornelius & Bruce Kogut eds., 2003) (discussing the Kirby effect:
entrepreneurs use the title "LLC" for their businesses but forgo limiting the liability
by actually registering the businesses as LLCs for fear of being noticed by
governmental authorities).
31 See, e.g., Interview with T.E., D.L., and Q.F. in Abidjan, C6te d'Ivoire (June
28, 2004) (anonymity to protect interviewees) (noting that the SARL is the most
widely used business form in the C6te d'Ivoire).
32 See Lavelle, supra note 2, at 722.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 722-26 (discussing the use of exchanges as vehicles for
privatization).
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corporation. 35  Pricing a business is always fraught with
guesswork, or at least with a heavy application of judgment.
However, that valuation is particularly an art rather than a
science when the company's accounting has been non-
transparent, as is often the case for a parastatal business. If the
government prices the company too high, it simply will not sell.
This could be embarrassing for the government, and there
certainly would be excessive transaction costs including wasteful
delays; however, the failed-sale outcome at least does not entail
the export of a substantial portion of a national asset. In
contrast, if the government sets the price too low in its dealings
with the foreign purchaser, the property of the state-of the
people-is sold below market to a foreigner. 36  The state has
transferred without adequate compensation part of the national
patrimony to the foreign purchaser. This is not good from an
economic standpoint; it may be problematic politically as well. 37
The alternative to selling to a foreigner is to privatize by
doing an initial public offering on the local stock exchange. The
local market may help the government price the shares, but if the
market is relatively thin, the risk of mispricing remains
significant. If the government's price is too high, however, the
only harm is a waste of transaction costs because the stock
simply will not sell, barring issues of asymmetry of information.38
If the government-dictated price is too low, on the other hand, a
stock market provides a distinct advantage over the private sale:
a government that, through an exchange, offers shares at below
market has some chance of selling to its own local citizenry. 39 In
that case, the good news is that the national patrimony-the
windfall-is transferred to domestic holders; it is not exported. 40
35 See id. at 736 (listing the largest shareholders, most of which are foreign
multinationals, of companies listed on the regional exchange in Abidjan, C6te
d'Ivoire).
36 See infra Part II.B (discussing privatization).
37 See infra Part II.B.
38 The venue makes no difference here: the outcome would be the same in an
attempted private sale.
39 See Lavelle, supra note 2, at 727-28, 735 (noting the significant Ivorian and
West African participation in the regional stock market).
40 See, e.g., Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731
(2000) (describing the corruption that occurred at the time of the post-Communist,
Russian privatization). Depending on negotiations with potential purchasers, the
state might end up with a hybrid sale, i.e., part of the parastatal sold to a foreign
1170 [Vol. 79:1161
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2. Only Domestic "Public Corporations" Are Relevant for
Purposes of Comparison
These developing-country public corporations traded on local
exchanges as a consequence of privatization are not necessarily
the only public corporations present in developing countries. A
foreign multinational may be trading goods or services, or
investing, directly in that country; if the multinational's shares
are publicly traded in its home jurisdiction, it is of course a public
corporation operating in the developing world. However, I am
directing the discussion of public corporations to only those
corporations that are publicly traded on local developing-country
exchanges and are, as a practical matter, formed under local
laws.41 Foreign multinationals with any serious investment or
other presence in a developing country generally operate through
a controlled or wholly owned subsidiary corporation.42 That
wholly owned subsidiary obviously is not publicly held. If,
instead of being 100% owned by the foreign multinational, the
controlled subsidiary has some of its shares locally traded, the
foreign owner likely purchased its interest when the subsidiary
corporation was being denationalized. In other words, most
subsidiaries are not publicly held, and those that are partially
traded on a public market tend to be majority-held by the foreign
parent. 43 That is the classic configuration of the developing-
country public company. Whatever its impact on the emerging
economy, the foreign multinational company itself is not a
developing-country, public company.
The more conceptual reason for ignoring the foreign
multinational directly present in a developing country and
purchaser, and part sold on the local stock exchange. It is unlikely that local
purchasers will have sufficient capital to purchase the entire business directly from
the government; it is equally unlikely that the parastatal could be sold on a foreign
market. With this kind of arrangement, too, at least the pricing is in part
determined by a market, and at least some of the shares will remain with the local
citizenry to reduce the damages caused mispricing. See infra Part II.B (discussing
privatization).
41 The regional stock exchange in Abidjan is a case in point: every listed
company is Ivorian, except for a Senegalese company. See MBendi, supra note 28
(describing the regional stock exchange's listed companies).
42 See, e.g., Lavelle, supra note 2, at 735, 738 (describing access of the Ivorian
"capitalist class" to shares in foreign multinationals' subsidiaries).
43 See id. at 735 (showing that in 1999, Ivoirian interests held a majority
interest, or were the largest single shareholder, of only 20% of the companies listed
on the Abidjan exchange).
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focusing instead on that country's domestic public corporations is
to offer a comparative analysis. In order to derive benefit from
the unique perspective that a comparison offers, the categories
must be meaningful and clear. On the developed-country side of
the equation, we will look at U.S. public corporations traded on a
U.S. exchange. On the West African side of the equation, we
must similarly consider corporations formed in West Africa and
traded there. 44
For our purposes, then, the core learning is that West
African stock exchanges are vehicles for privatization and that
corporations list on these exchanges to help the government limit
export of the national patrimony. 45
C. Governance: Political Versus Corporate Issues
"Governance" has no special meaning in West Africa with
respect to corporations and is thus a false cognate for lawyers
trained in the North.46 Developing-country private practitioners,
even sophisticated ones involved in corporate practice and
consistently in contact with northern law firms, perceive
"governance" and, specifically, "good governance," as terms
referring to the political sphere. 47 While law professors are
prepared to discuss the topic with respect to its applicability to
the corporate arena, most dismiss it as irrelevant, 48 or even
dangerous. 49
44 A multinational will tend to carry its own norms with it. See, e.g., Claire
Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of Control: The Virtual Organization and Conflicting
Governance Vectors, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 759, 789-93 (1998) (discussing the impact in
developing countries of a United States corporation's developed-country norms-
both pro-shareholder norms formed by the business community and stakeholder
norms championed by, inter alia, anti-apartheid or pro-worker activists).
45 This does not eliminate the local elites' incentive to retain and expand their
economic influence, and thus to support for their own reasons the use of the local
exchange as the privatization vehicle. See, e.g., Lavelle, supra note 2, at 725-26
(describing the elites' interest); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the effects of
using vouchers in the context of privatization).
46 See Interview with Me. B.K. in Douala, Cameroon (July 5, 2004) (anonymity
to protect interviewee).
47 See id.; Interview with Me. F.B. in Douala, Cameroon (July 5, 2004)
(anonymity to protect interviewee).
48 See Interview with Anne-Marie Assi-Esso, Professor of Law, in Abidjan, C6te
d'Ivoire (June 30, 2004).
49 See, e.g., Interview with Paul-G6rard Pougou6, Vice Rector and Professor of
Law, in Soa, Cameroon (July 9, 2004) (discussing "intir~t social" as a way of avoiding
"abus").
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Concepts of corporate governance are irrelevant for one
simple reason-social issues tend to overwhelm corporations.
The absence or presence of political corruption, for example, is a
crucial distinction when determining how, and for whose benefit,
the corporation is governed. If a country is tied for 129th
position out of a possible 145 countries on Transparency
International's Corruption Perceptions Index, niceties such as
being able to distinguish the role of a director from that of a
shareholder become irrelevant. 50 If the country is significantly
more autocratic than democratic, 51 the problem of corruption
typically becomes that much more intractable.
52
In Cameroon, a practicing lawyer told me that the
government participates in the exercise of "chantage
alimentaire," or blackmail by starvation, against judges.53 What
50 In 2004, Cameroon, for example, was tied for 129th out of 145 countries. See
TRANSPARENCY INT'L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS
INDEX 2004, at 4 tbl.1 (2004), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/
2004/cpi2004.en.html#cpi2004. Cameroon's Corruption Perceptions Index was 2.1, as
compared to the highest score of 9.7 held by Finland, and the lowest of 1.5 held by
Haiti. See id. In West Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the C6te d'Ivoire
(tied for 133rd with a score of 2.0), Chad (in 142nd place with an index of 1.7), and
Nigeria (in 144th with an index of 1.6), were identified as even more corrupt. See id.
By way of comparison, the United States was tied for 17th with a score of 7.5. See id.
51 See Polity IV Country Report 2003: Cameroon, available at
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/Caol.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005)
(indicating that Cameroon scored at a -4 on Polity IV's scale measuring the level of a
country's autocracy or democracy). This scale indicates constructed annual measures
for both institutionalized democracy and autocracy-a +10 indicating a full
democracy, and a -10 indicating a full autocracy. See POLITY IV PROJECT: DATASET
USERS' MANUAL 13 (2002), available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
p4manualv2002.pdf. For its purpose, Polity IV defines democracy as follows:
Institutionalized Democracy: Democracy is conceived as three essential,
interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about
alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized
constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of
political participation.
Id.
52 Sadly, promoting woman-owned businesses does not appear to be a means of
reducing corruption. See Ranjana Mukherjee & Omer Gokcekus, Gender and
Corruption in the Public Sector, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2004, at 337, 337-
39 (Robin Hodess, Tania Inowlocki, Diana Rodriguez, & Toby Wolfe, eds., 2004),
available at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2004.html (noting that
corruption is higher where there are either too few women, or too many, but also
conceding that the causal vector may be in the other direction-that pre-existing
corruption, itself, creates the gender imbalance).
53 See Interview with Me. Q.T. in Douala, Cameroon (July 2004) (anonymity to
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this usually means is that a judge, who does not comply with
governmental wishes, will be transferred to a less desirable part
of the country-a particularly persuasive sentence since the
victim is left with no viable alternative. 54 Under the French
system in general, and in Cameroon in particular, a judge and
practicing lawyer perform on such different tracks that a former
judge does not even have the option of moving into private
practice to gain shelter from governmental excess. 55 In this
context, corporate governance can easily seem irrelevant.
Concepts of corporate governance can even be dangerous.
Focusing on corporate governance when there is significant
political failure can seem like a waste of effort; however, it can be
worse: it can create an environment favorable to political
corruption. In West Africa, as elsewhere, many articulated
principles of corporate governance are more akin to standards
than rules. For example, sixteen West African countries have
adopted a corporate law that is based on the French legal system.
Consequently, the standard of corporate social responsibility
recognized in these countries is, likewise, inherited from the
French-one referred to as "intir~t social.'56  This concept,
roughly translated as "corporate interest" or "social interest,"
instructs managers to consider the interests not only of
shareholders, but also of employees, and of suppliers or
customers.57 The broadest definition of "intrt social" demands
that managers take into account even the interests of the State
before acting.58 What are the risks created by such a wide-
protect interviewee).
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See MAMADOU KONP,, LE NouvEAU DROIT COMMERCIAL DES PAYS DE LA ZONE
OHADA: COMPARAISONS AVEC LE DROIT FRANCAIS 157-58 (2003).
57 See id.
58 The sixteen countries, mostly francophone former French colonies, adopted
the OHADA Treaty in 1993 that formed the Organization for the Harmonization in
Africa of Business Laws ("OHADA"). See C6lbration du 1Ome anniversaire du
Traitd OHADA sign6 e Port Louis le 17 Octobre 1993 (Oct. 17, 2003),
http://www.ohada.net/article-fr.php?idac=41. See generally OHADA.com,
http://www.ohada.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (providing general information on
OHADA); OHADA.org, http://www.ohada.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (OHADA's
official website). Pursuant to the OHADA Treaty, uniform laws, including the one on
business organizations, have become internal laws of the OHADA state-parties. See
OHADA Treaty, art. 10, Uniform Act Relating to Commercial Companies and
Economic Interest Group, available at http://www.ohada.coml
textes.php?categorie=100 (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (providing that the Uniform
1174 [Vol. 79:1161
SEX AND CAPITAL
ranging standard?
As emphasized by a Cameroonian academic, to the extent
that judges are venal or incompetent, or that they have been
merely co-opted by the government through blackmail by
starvation, it is particularly dangerous to allow them the
discretion that is inevitably involved in the application of
standards. 59 Thus, surprising to us in the North, the path to a
cleaner economy includes replacing standard-based issues of
corporate governance by clear rules that eliminate the need for
judicial discretion. 60
Finally, in an environment wasted by endemic diseases from
malaria to AIDS, and where per capita income is below two
dollars a day, corporate governance is a luxury. As I argue
elsewhere, I do believe that this attitude is unnecessarily
defeatist. 61 Nevertheless, as a descriptive matter, the dominant
perception in the region holds that the political system's
catastrophic failure renders corporate governance meaningless.
62
What is needed is good political governance, not merely good
corporate governance.
Acts adopted pursuant to the treaty become automatically the internal law of the
state-parties to the treaty); Ohada.org, Organisation et Harmonisation des
Comptabilit~s des Entreprises, http://www.ohada.netactesconsfr.php?IDTexte=
1 4
(last visited Oct. 14, 2005). The concept of "intdr~t social" (corporate interest) is a
principle that is stakeholder in nature. See, e.g., KONt, supra note 56, at 157-58
(discussing the three theories of int~r~t social under French corporate law). See
generally Claire Moore Dickerson, Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA
Calls the Thne, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 2005) (describing
OHADA).
59 This is Professor Pougou6's point. See Interview with Paul-G6rard Pougou6,
supra note 49 (cautioning against giving discretion to judges).
60 These issues of corporate governance can arise whenever there is any
separation of management from ownership. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 247-76 (1933)
(describing the separation of ownership from management). Thus, the issues do
manifest themselves even where there are few public corporations; all that is
necessary is the absence of absolute identity between owner(s) and manager(s). Of
course, replacing standards by rules creates its own problems. See, e.g., Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1687-1713 (1976) (discussing standards versus rules).
61 Norms, even of limited application, can be aspirational and influence further
changes. See Dickerson, supra note 58.
62 See, e.g., Interview with Me. F.B., supra note 47 (discussing corruption and
dismissing the concept of "intir~t social").
11752005]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
II. THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS PUTS THE NORTH IN RELIEF
A comparative analysis helps contextualize the relationship
of gender to governance of public corporations. The West African
experience shifts our point of perspective-it questions the
centrality of our northern, developed-country experience.
Instead of comparing the rest of the world to us, we are
comparing ourselves to another reality.
To effect this comparison, we have to consider for the United
States the same factors that we reviewed for West Africa. Our
study must focus on the context for women in business, on the
purpose of the public corporation, and on political realities in
general. By using comparative law as a tool, we can gain enough
distance to obtain a new perspective on the progress and position
of our own nest.
A. Women Entrepreneurs: The Class Structure in the Developed
World
We saw that in West Africa, the role of women in business is
largely divorced from public companies, in part because there are
very few domestic public corporations. 63 We also saw that women
in business fall into two large categories defined on the one hand
by wealth and education, and on the other by the products they
offer and the geographic range they roam.64 One class of women
serves as entrepreneurs in small-scale enterprises. While this is
vital to the informal economy, it is constrained by traditional
understandings of social roles. 65 This class is also constrained by
a lack of capital assets-a problem inadequately and unreliably
alleviated by outside sources' ostensibly well-meaning efforts to
remedy the situation through micro-loans.6 6 The other elite class
of women in business includes leaders in larger enterprises
concerned with a wider variety of products. 67 Although they offer
much promise for the future, it is hard to say that the new class
to which these businesswomen belong already has a greater
impact on the local economy than does the old class. The small-
scale businesswomen are much more numerous than the elite
businesswomen, and they operate in an informal economy that is
63 See supra Part I.B (discussing public corporations).
6 See supra Part L.A (discussing classes of women).
65 See supra Part L.A and accompanying notes.
66 See supra Part L.A and accompanying notes.
67 See supra Part L.A and accompanying notes.
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very significant in size and reach. 68
Comparison suggests the necessity of an analysis broader
than a mere contrast of the public corporation in developing
countries with the public corporation in developed countries; it
suggests the necessity of an analysis more dependent on function
than on classification. Consider, for example, that the
concentration of wealth in many developing countries is even
greater than in the United States. 69 To the extent that, for
example, families and kinship affiliations are the source of
business capital, they are the appropriate analogies in West
Africa to the United States' public corporations. Thus, the
comparative discussion asks us to consider the role of northern
women close to capital.
In the very recent past, we have had the edifying experience
of watching the rise and fall of Carly Fiorina at Hewlett-Packard,
a U.S.-based public corporation.70 As the chief executive officer of
Hewlett-Packard, she was close to capital. The media rehearsed,
in detail, whether she was fired because she is a woman, not
fired earlier because she is a woman, and even whether she had
originally been hired because she is a woman. 71 This kind of
discussion describes the outer boundaries of class-based un-
gendering: the media raised these gender-based questions after
Fiorina lost her job-after she lost her elite status.
What is interesting to me is how the Fiorina example
underscores that our discussion of corporate governance has
become fragmented when talking about the role of women. Many
women's work issues are discussed generically, without focusing
on their particular role in the business hierarchy. In contrast, if
women are identified primarily as senior managers, we may
consider board members like Wendy Gramm in roughly the same
68 See Spring, supra note 7, at 384-87 & tbl. 1.
69 See Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic
Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 285, 316 (2003) (noting the increasing
concentration of wealth in post-communist and developing countries).
70 See generally Claudia H. Deutsch, Carl Fiorina? He'd Probably Be Out of
Work, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at 3 (characterizing Fiorina's up and down
tenure as chief executive of Hewlett-Packard as "turbulent").
71 See id. (discussing whether Carleton "Carly" Fiorina would have kept her job
longer had she been a man); see also Carol Hymowitz, Shake-Up at Hewlett-
Packard-In the Lead: Carly Fiorina's Lesson in Equality, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2005, at A9 (asserting that Fiorina's firing is evidence that women are treated like
men).
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conceptual paragraph, 72 but we discuss, separately, women in
smaller roles, for example as employees.7 3
There exist many possible reasons for this phenomenon,
including the fact that the legal field creates a division of subject
matter between corporate law, on the one hand, and labor and
employment law on the other. Even when we lawyers in the
United States limit our scope of view to business, and specifically
to public corporations, we avoid overt reference to class. Instead
of discussing women managers and employees as similarly
situated, except for class, we choose to analyze the roles of
managers and employees as wholly separate functions.
Because of realities in the developing world, in contrast,
studies of those regions do not tend to focus on employee-status
as a separate category-that is not the fault-line7 4 The evolving
discussion is, instead, about women entrepreneurs and their
overtly class-based networks, 75 and it is this division between the
networks of entrepreneurial West African women that invites us
to search for class differences in our own environment. The
developed-country functional analogue to the woman
entrepreneur with both the greatest sophistication and greatest
access to capital, namely the elite entrepreneur, is a public
corporation's female senior manager. Similarly, in the public-
corporation setting, the developed-country functional analogue to
the small-scale entrepreneur is that corporation's female
employee. For each of these developed-world classes, questions
wrung from the West African experience include: How can these
72 See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1236 n.19, 1264 n.172 (2003) (noting Wendy Gramm's
presence on Enron's board).
73 See Claire Moore Dickerson, Corporations as Cities: Targeting the Nodes in
Overlapping Networks, 29 J. CORP. L. 533, 550 (2004) (discussing the separation in
analysis between labor and employment law, on the one hand, and corporate law on
the other). Compare O'Connor, supra note 72, at 1233-67 (discussing directors,
without specifically focusing on women), with O'Connor-Felman, supra note 16, at
1287-93 (emphasizing women as employees).
74 There are discussions about women as founder-entrepreneurs of developed-
country public corporations, but these women represent a small segment of business
women in the developed world. Currently, the most prominent example may be
eBay's Meg Whitman. See, e.g., Merissa Marr, Mylene Mangalindan & Joanne S.
Lublin, Cast Change: Disney Turns to Insider Iger to Take CEO Reins from Eisner,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2005, at Al (alluding to the fact that Disney's board would
have considered it highly positive to have lured Meg Whitman, eBay's founder and
CEO, to replace departing CEO Michael Eisner).
75 See generally Spring, supra note 7.
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women obtain fair access to capital and the opportunity to
develop it, and how does class difference affect our answers?
From the perspective of power and independence, the
separation by class in West Africa is, indeed, not so different
from the unarticulated fragmentation that we find in the United
States. Interestingly, however, there is evidence that, soon after
studies identified the distinction between traditional and elite
female entrepreneurs, West African women were already using
their business associations to reach across the newly articulated
class barrier. 76 This outcome is not entirely surprising given that
the need for capital and the issues of second shift are similar for
both West African classes. Nevertheless, we have also seen that
there are profound differences between these West African
classes concerning the amount of capital their members seek, and
concerning how subjugation to the second shift manifests itself.
In West Africa, the salience of these differences may attenuate as
the women articulate the divide, and then seek to bridge it.
77 If
developed-country organizations, including the legal academy,
were to address expressly and systematically, as a unified topic,
the similarities and differences of employees' and senior
managers' gender-based experiences, perhaps these, too, would
begin to change.
As another aspect of the comparative analysis, we could also
ask whether West African public corporations would more
frequently leave the national patrimony in the hands of the local
citizenry if more women were in a leadership position. Assuming
that the women in question have the education and experience to
evaluate pricing mechanisms, the central question will concern
the likelihood that women, as compared to men, will take
advantage of the well-known opportunity to skim financial
benefits for themselves in the privatization process. 78 In other
words, do women, in fact, further the purpose of West African
corporations? This question focuses us on the realization that in
order to appreciate what role women should play in northern
76 See id. at 387-88.
77 See supra Part L.A (indicating that the "traditional" female entrepreneurs
catered mostly to their immediate geographical region through familial ties whereas
the "elite" class organized a more "global" network).
78 See infra Part II.B (describing, generally, Russian privatization efforts to
limit abuse). See generally Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, supra note 40 (detailing
the flood of "self-dealing" and corruption that existed during Russia's endeavor
towards mass privatization in the early 1990s).
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public corporations, we have to understand what society intends
these public corporations to accomplish. This requires a
discussion concerning the role of public corporations in the
developed world. As a society, we need to identify the benefit
that society is to derive from the concentration of capital
generated by public issuance of securities. This issue is the
subject of the next section.
B. Public Corporations in the Developed World
Public corporations are different from private corporations.
Private corporations issue shares to persons who often will
remain engaged in the management of the incorporated business.
Public corporations issue shares to members of the public who
typically have no expectation of significant input into managerial
decisions. 79 Why does a corporation in the United States choose
to be public and to be faced with the separation of ownership
from management? Whether we adopt Milton Friedman's
assertion that a corporation's job is to increase its profits,80 or
instead adhere to the progressives' understanding that a
corporation has an obligation to constituencies in addition to its
stockholderssl or perhaps adopt some third set of assumptions
about a corporation's role in society including those inherent in
other developed-country jurisdictions,2 there is a single, simple
answer to explain why a corporation goes public in the United
States. Straightforwardly, the corporation wants to raise capital,
or, more precisely, once its managers have taken care of their
own liquidity needs, they want the corporation to raise capital.8 3
79 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 60, at 274-76 (discussing the separation of
ownership from management).
80 See Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 17
(discussing his own theory on corporate social responsibility).
81 See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
(collecting essays of progressive corporate lawyers at the height of the Progressives'
push).
82 See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The
Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, CORNELL INT'L L.J.(forthcoming 2005) (arguing that the U.K. has moved to a middle ground between
the U.S. and the continent); see also Claire Moore Dickerson, Ozymandias as
Community Project: Managerial/Corporate Social Responsibility and the Failure of
Transparency, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1035, 1055-58 (2003) (describing U.K. efforts at
corporate governance reform during the 1990s).
33 See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1317 (2002) (noting that in the context of the accounting
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This is a very different reason from that extant in West
Africa. There, a corporation goes public as a way of preserving a
nation's patrimony when it privatizes businesses.
8 4 This West-
African role creates a social benefit as it offers an important
constraint on self-dealing by elites. Those who can buy property
through the privatization process will likely possess economic
power that is very significant in the context, and thus the risk of
abuse is far from negligible.85 As we saw, using a stock market to
effect denationalization of the economy reduces the opportunity
for, and the negative impact of, such abuse. Of course, the risk of
abuse is not eliminated so long as the probability of under-pricing
is substantial; this outcome is virtually inevitable in a privatizing
economy because comparables are few and imponderables are
many. 6 Nevertheless, the market notionally helps establish a
fair price, and the citizens who (indirectly) owned the corporation
before denationalization can retain their interest by purchasing
shares from the government.
manipulations of Enron, a public corporation,"[o]ne issues stock to raise capital").
Interestingly, the capital-raising purpose of public corporations is one of these
truisms that law reviews do not generally write about, and neither do practitioners.
The recent Google, Inc. initial public offering ("IPO"), for example, certainly made
the founders paper-rich and will provide them an exit strategy, but the founders also
emphasized that the IPO-generated funds will help the company continue to evolve.
See Shane Kite, Capital Markets: Google Goes Dutch, Rocking IPO Sector, BANKING
TECH. NEWS, Aug. 4, 2004, at 27 (reporting that the challenge to those trying to
convince corporate treasurers to perform a Google-style Dutch auction IPO instead
of using traditional, investment-banking methods is to convince corporate treasurers
that the price (and thus the proceeds to the corporation) will be higher with the
Dutch auction). But see Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital
Require an Active Stock Market?, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36, 41 (1999) (noting that
a stock market is necessary for a venture capitalist's exit, and therefore its
involvement); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613,
647 (1988) (pointing out that there are many sources of financing for corporations
other than public equity markets). In other words, raising capital for the corporate
issuer is a reason, but not necessarily the only reason, for developed country IPOs.
84 See supra Part I.B (describing the privatization system in West Africa).
85 See generally Anthony V. Raftopol, Note, Russian Roulette: A Theoretical
Analysis of Voucher Privatization in Russia, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 435 (1993) (offering a
comprehensive review of Russia's voucher program). But see Black, Kraakman &
Tarassova, supra note 40, at 1746-49 (describing the kleptocracy that ensued).
86 See Susan S. Cummings, Environmental Protection and Privatization: The
Allocation of Environmental Responsibility and Liability in Sale Transactions of
State-Owned Companies in Poland, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 551, 557-58
(1994) (describing the uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of environmental
laws in post-Communist Poland, and the consequent impact on potential purchasers'
valuation of businesses that the government was seeking to privatize).
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What the market does not do is raise capital. This is
especially true if, as has occurred in Russia, the citizens receive
scrip from the government so that they do not have to pay again
for property that theoretically belonged to them even before
privatization.87 With that arrangement, the corporation
obviously receives no funds since none are paid. Further, even if
the citizens have to generate conventional capital with which to
purchase the privatizing shares through the exchange, the
corporation still receives no assets. Only the government as the
seller receives compensation. Although the nation benefits both
when the patrimony is retained within the nation and as the
government receives compensation, the corporation raises no
capital.88
In contrast, as we have seen when a corporation goes public
in the United States or in another developed country, it issues
shares or other securities to natural and juridical persons who, in
return, pour the purchase price into the corporation's coffers. As
a descriptive matter, the act of raising capital from the public
distinguishes public from private corporations.8 9
By starting from the issues raised by the comparative
analysis, and by questioning why we allow this method of
aggregating capital, we are prepared to see that the separation of
ownership from management is a means of encouraging the use
of public capital. Without stretching the thought too far, the
1990s scandals now wending their ignominious way through our
courts demonstrate that at least some managers held the
normative belief that capital received from shareholders is ripe
for the taking. Their criminal activities were designed to
increase the stock price which would, among other consequences,
increase the ease with which their corporations could raise
87 See Raftopol, supra note 85, at 455-58 (discussing the flow of vouchers in
Russia between citizens and the government).88 See id. (describing Russia's voucher program).
89 Professors argue about management's duty to public shareholders, butlawyers and businesspeople in the thick of public offerings recognize that the core
focus is on the corporation's ability to raise capital in the public markets. See supra
note 83 (discussing capital-raising). Compare Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral
Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool,35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 606-07 (2002) (discussing permissive statutes), with
Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1435-47 (1993) (offering a
spirited defense of the shareholder wealth/profit-maximization model).
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capital from the largely powerless and ignorant public.
90 That is
why managers hid company liabilities by moving them off
balance sheet (Enron), falsified profits by capitalizing expenses
(WorldCom), and generally flattened the volatility of their
earnings (General Electric). 91
The developed-world public corporation's ability to raise
capital is a powerful tool, tempting to managers. Our
comparative analysis prompts a question. We saw that in West
Africa the corporation's purpose for issuing securities to the
public was at least ostensibly tied to a public good, namely the
increased ability to preserve the assets' value for 
the citizens. 92
What then is the public purpose in allowing a corporation to
issue securities in the United States in order to raise capital?
Looking for the purpose of raising capital, we can be
grandiose and claim along with former General Motors Chief
Executive Officer Charles Wilson that, "what is good for General
Motors is good for the nation."93  What is central to this
90 The public's ignorance may be willful. See infra note 107 and accompanying
text (emphasizing the willfulness).
91 The fact that many senior managers had shares and options and therefore
directly benefited from artificially high stock prices does not reduce the 
importance
of maintaining the ability to issue shares for new capital, including in 
the context of
an acquisition. See Marc F. Holzapfel, An Analysis of the Section 3(a)(10) Exemption
Under the Securities Act of 1933 in the Context of the Public Offering Component of
Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
427, 437 n.62 (2003) (describing corporations' use of their own shares, especially if
highly priced, as acquisition compensation); see also Bratton, supra note 83, at 1282-
85 (describing the Enron debacle); David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management
Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 890, 898-99 (2002) (discussing WorldCom's capitalization of expenses
in order to hide the later and inflate profits, and General Electric's 
"elaborate
financial manipulations" designed to squeeze volatility out of its earnings).
92 See supra Part I.B (discussing public corporations in West Africa). There is
also, of course, the elites' opportunity to skim financial gain from 
any major
restructuring. See, e.g., Lavelle, supra note 2, at 725 (discussing the elites' interest).
This is similar to the developed country founders, including the venture 
capital
firms' use of the IPO as an exit. For our purposes, the articulated existence 
of a
public-good explanation is important as that is the conversation that the 
developed
world no longer broaches.
93 TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS: BUILDING THE INTERSTATE HIGHWAYS,
TRANSFORMING AMERICAN LIFE 106-07 (1999) (quoting Charles Wilson, U.S.
Secretary of Defense and former CEO of GM). But see SIDNEY DELL, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 55 (1990) (quoting U.S. Secretary of
Defense Charles Wilson to have said, '"What is good for the country is 
good for
General Motors, and what's good for General Motors is good for the country"); A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMIC QUOTATIONS 9 (Simon James ed., 2d ed. 1984) (asserting
that in 1953 Charles Wilson actually said to Congress, "What is good for the 
country
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discussion, however, is to avoid assuming the inevitability of the
current reality. Although separation of management from
ownership facilitates raising capital, we should not focus only onthat separation, as so many of us who study corporate law havedone since Berle and Means first articulated the issue.94 Eventhe progressive corporate scholars' analysis starts by questioning
the consequence of the separation-to whom do the managers
owe a duty?95 To be sure, separation of ownership fueled the U.S.
scandals of the 1990s since managers needed to have an "other"from whom to steal. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis offers
us the clear opportunity to ask foundational questions: why does
society allow managers, through the public corporations, to use
citizens' wealth? Should society demand a quid pro quo for thattremendous advantage, in addition to shareholders' right toparticipate in the vicissitudes of the corporation's business, and if
so, what should the quid pro quo be?
Comparative analysis will not give us the answers; that is
our job as members of the society that authorizes these
corporations. However, recognizing the question is the first stepto addressing it, and we may be surprised by the answer. Thereis some evidence that the larger U.S. community's view of
corporate responsibility is not fiercely pro-shareholder.96 Thebody politic might lean toward application of at least a narrow
conception of "intrt social," in which case the debate wouldinvolve topics well-known to academics, such as longer time-horizons and increased productivity.97 Interestingly, thisdiscussion leads us overtly to the political context of corporate
is good for General Motors, and vice versa"); Gregory Gelfand, "Taking"Informational Property Through Discovery, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 703, 728 n.99 (1988)(listing the above permutations of the quote ascribed to Charles Wilson).
94 See William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn,26 J. CORP. L. 737, 752 (2001) (discussing the authors' expectation that separationwould become increasingly acute); see also supra note 60 (discussing Berle &Means).
95 See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA'SNEWEST EXPORT 115-16 (2001) (discussing the conflicts and pressures on even themost well-meaning managers, caused by the markets' scrutiny of short-term
results).
96 An example would include the arguably pro-stakeholder demands of activistsdemanding better conditions for workers producing Nike products. See Claire MooreDickerson, Transnational Codes of Conduct Through Dialogue: Leveling the PlayingField for Developing-Country Workers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 611, 641-43, 650-53 (2001)(discussing consumer activists' pressure on Nike).
97 See MITCHELL, supra note 95, at 157-58.
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governance.
C. Governance: Political Versus Corporate Issues
In West Africa, issues of political governance loom larger
than those of corporate governance. When the scholars in the
United States analyze corporate governance, they instead focus
deliberately on corporations. In fact, in the United States, we
tend to ignore the impact of the corporation's socio-political
surroundings.98 The progressive corporate governance scholars
consider those surroundings more than do the shareholder-
primacy aficionados because the progressives argue that the
corporation has obligations to a broader constituency than only
shareholders. Thus, they urge us to consider a corporation's
impact on a larger category of persons.
99 Nevertheless, as a
general matter, we in the United States focus on private rather
than political actors.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002100 is a case in point. It
introduces detailed procedures to constrain managers from the
misbehavior that was the hallmark of the 1990s. Senior
management is now obligated to certify the accuracy of certain
financial documents, and boards must include so-called
independent directors to populate the board committee
responsible for supervising audits.10 ' Many of us consider "SOX,"
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is somewhat derisively known, to be
largely cosmetic.'
0 2
98 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1174
(1998) (discussing political agents in the U.S., whose willingness to structure the
capital markets without interfering with them has been central to the 
markets'
development).
99 See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, supra note 81.
100 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.).
101 See id. §§ 301, 116 Stat. at 775-77 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1, requiring
independent directors for the audit committee), 302, 116 Stat. at 777-78 (requiring
the CEO and CFO, or their functional equivalents, to certify in various 
ways their
company's financial statements). Listing requirements for NASDAQ and the New
York Stock Exchange have piggy-backed SOX and now stipulate that 
independent
directors also determine the process for nominating directors. See David F. Morrison,
Shareholder Proxy Access-America Should Not Go It Alone Again, INSIGHTS, 
Aug.
2004, at 2, 2 (summarizing certain new, post-SOX listing requirements).
102 See Dickerson, supra note 82, at 1054-55 (asserting that SOX is partly
redundant and partly irrelevant); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as
Confirmation of Recent Trends in Director and Officer Fiduciary Obligations, 76 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 953, 976-77 (2002) (questioning the impact of SOX); see also Steve
2005)
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1161
One point is certain, however; SOX does not invite us toquestion any of the fundamental assumptions, large or small,
about corporate governance. 0 3  It does not ask whether
corporations should focus on shareholder profit maximization.104
It does not ask whether we have to assume that people appointed
to senior posts need SOX's brand of blunt-tool protection from
venal pressures.105  More generally, SOX does not inquire
whether the wrongs of the 1990s were the result of a particularly
vicious swing of the normative pendulum. 06 It does not consider
that members of the public knew about many of the excessesduring the 1990s but were shocked (shocked!) only after the
market had crashed.107 The reason why SOX does not focus on
the public's expectation is because SOX's drafters and adopters,in their eagerness to remedy specific wrongs, resolutely ignored
the larger socio-political considerations. The vast swath of
corporate scholarship and media analysis of corporations in theUnited States simply does not think of corporations in a socio-political context. We worry about specifics-about shareholdersfirst and foremost. In truly horrendous circumstances, theimmiserated employees receive some attention. For example,
Enron employees suffered large losses in the value of their
retirement plan investments during a "blackout period" when
they were banned from trading. In response, SOX now preventsdirectors and executive officers from trading even outside the
Seidenberg, Compliance Alert: Companies Across the Board Are Re-Examining TheirEthics Policies, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 26, 2002, at A14, 14-15 (reporting comments ofDaniel J. Churay, senior counsel at Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, to the effect thatSOX merely codifies pre-SOX best practices). Arguably, the Republicans in Congress
who currently seek to weaken SOX agree since they complain about SOX's cost: ifthe benefit is little, any additional cost is too great. See Stephen Laboton, A NewMood in Congress to Relax Corporate Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at C3(reporting that Sen. Richard C. Shelby, Ala. R., Sarbane's successor as chair of theSenate Banking Committee, is focusing SOX's cost to small business, and argues
that SOX "may have gone too far").
103 See Dickerson, supra note 82, at 1053-54 (discussing the limitations of SOX
and the potential lack of impact SOX will have on corporate behavior).
104 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: HeavyRhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003)(detailing SOX's provisions which do not include any mention of maximizing
shareholder profit).
105 See Fairfax, supra note 102, at 977 (questioning the ability of the SarbanesOxley Act to compel directors to comply with their responsibilities).
106 See Dickerson, supra note 82, at 1054-55.
107 See id. at 1035 (noting that the U.S. public knew of the Enron excesses but
did not care that transparency is not a panacea).
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plan during such a period,108 but that is a very narrow response
to a problem reflecting a broad social reality about business
norms.
In contrast, our review of the West African perspective on
corporate governance reveals an emphasis on political
governance. We explored the reasons for this focus and noted
that the political situation in the United States is less
authoritarian and less prone to political corruption.
10 9
Nevertheless, the comparative analysis offers an interesting
point of view: what could we learn by considering corporate
governance to be a deeply political issue?
If we examine corporations in a political context but from a
great altitude, we could see that the corporation is not merely a
nexus of contracts as Jensen and Meckling famously asserted.
110
Instead, the corporation is a network: just as the entrepreneurs
in West Africa build their businesses through networks of
relationships, 1 ' there is a network within the corporation built
on interactions among those who work within the corporation.
There also is a network between those people and their
counterparts in the roles of suppliers and customers. Thus,
instead of being merely an interaction at the level of managers
and shareholders, a corporation is a community and is part of
other communities. 12 If we understand the corporation to be
embedded in rather than separated from society's non-business
aspects, we are again prompted to ask why society allows the
public corporation to concentrate wealth, and what the
corporation owes society in return.
This conception of the corporation as a community and as
part of the larger socio-political community also invites us to
question where the boundaries of the various communities are
located. In the West African context, the boundaries are defined
108 See Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive
Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote
Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 1003-04 (2004)
(describing the "blackout period," the Enron employees' losses, and the SOX
response).
109 See Polity IV Country Report 2003: Cameroon, supra note 51.
110 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 n.13
(1976) (referring to the nexus of contracts).
1 See supra Part L.A (depicting the class structure and women entrepreneurs).
112 See Dickerson, supra note 73, at 550.
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by the reach of familial and business relationships within each
class of entrepreneurs. The comparative analysis encourages an
exploration of the boundaries in the developed world, an
exploration that would go well beyond the progressives'
suggestion that the corporation's community includes more than
managers and shareholders. Instead of viewing the corporation
as acting through its managers on constituencies that perhapsinclude others in addition to shareholders, the comparative
analysis shows us that business in West Africa depends on
networks. This helps us see that the boundaries have as manylocations as there are communities and are porous to socialinfluence both from these communities out, and from the outside
in. 113 That is why political corruption is so dangerous and why
the discretion inherent in "intrt social" is also dangerous,
despite the fact that the concept is wholly compatible with porous
borders. This issue of boundaries deserves explicit and directdiscussion: the exuberance of the Enron managers translated toMain Street which, by turning a blind eye crossed back into the
corporation and encouraged further excesses. 114
Taking a closer, more detailed view, we can see that
explicitly considering the larger political reality allows us to
appreciate more fully traditional concepts of corporate
governance, including board-composition. In this connection, the
recognition that the corporation is part of the larger political
reality also swings us back to the role of women, both in senior
113 Note that we would not be the only developed nation to speak about
community. In the 1920s, the French anthropologist and sociologist, Maurice Mauss,described a return to collectivism which he considered central to the French culture.See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAICSOCIETIES 65 (Ian Cunnison trans., 1967) (1925) (describing the resurgence of
collectivism in France); see also BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM INSAVAGE SOCIETY 48-52 (1926) (describing a functioning group in an archaic society,but arguably describing a form of government in actuality). Instead of celebratingthe nexus of a contracts concept central to our anglo-saxon theory of the firm, he
reports an impulse toward community. See MAUSS, supra, at 67 (describing the
evolving sense of community in France); see also R. H. Coase, The Nature of theFirm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 389 (1937) (describing the firm as a massive relational
contract); Williams & Conley, supra note 82 (describing the U.K.'s middle way,located between the U.S.'s shareholder primacy and the continent's stakeholderism).
A central tenet of French corporate law contains a strong sense of community. See,
e.g., KONE, supra note 56 (comparing "intirdt social" in France to its meaning underWest Africa's OHADA regime); Dickerson, supra note 82, at 1059-60 (discussing
"intert social" in France).
114 See Andy Pasztor, Boeing Management Comes Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Feb.
18, 2005, at A3.
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management and as employees.
Turning again to the West African focus on political
governance, when we understand public corporations to be
communities within communities, we are invited to look at the
role of women in the context of political corruption. Consider,
then, the recent disclosures concerning Boeing, the Pentagon,
and political corruption. 115  In the context of military
procurement, two former senior Pentagon officials, one of whom
is a woman, and one former senior Boeing officer have already
been convicted of criminal violations and sentenced to prison
terms and fines. 116  Perhaps the literature on board
composition, 117 combined with the West African focus on political
governance, could help clean up this corporate governance
scandal. For example, would greater diversity in senior
management, in this case having more women both at Boeing
and at the Pentagon, have changed the likelihood of such bribery
occurring?
To the extent that I can offer an answer, it is frankly
disappointing. According to a study in a series of developing
countries,118 an imbalance in the number of women relative to
men, whether it is few women or many, correlates positively with
more corruption. 1 9 This suggests that simply using women to fill
the ranks of upper management at public corporations or in
government will not improve integrity. On the other hand, as the
authors of the study themselves concede, it is possible that in the
115 See David Bowermaster, Ex-Pentagon Official Admits to More Illegal Help to
Boeing, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 2, 2004, at Al (discussing the admissions of Darleen
Druyun to illegally securing Defense Department contracts).
116 See Andy Pasztor, Boeing Ex-Officer Gets Prison Term Over Hiring Talks,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2005, at A5 (describing the prison sentence of former Boeing-
CFO Michael Sears); see also Tim Weiner, Boeing Hires a Legal Team to Handle
Scandal Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4 2005, at C3 (describing, inter alia, the
involvement of Darleen A. Druyun, who was "the Air Force's chief weapons buyer"
and, briefly, a senior Boeing executive, in a massive procurement scandal for which
she received a nine month prison sentence).
117 See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK (1972). See generally
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797,
810, 816 (2001) (discussing "groupthink" and asserting the importance that each
group has a "critical mass"); O'Connor, supra note 72.
11s See Mukherjee & Gokcekus, supra note 52, at 337-39 (discussing a study
conducted in Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Guyana, Indonesia, and Moldova).
119 This outcome is consistent with the concept of groupthink. See supra note
117 (discussing groupthink).
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circumstances they reviewed corruption had preceded theimbalance in genders rather than the other way around.120 If
that is correct and the disproportionately high representation of
women is the result and not the cause of the corruption, I can
still indulge in essentialist thinking. Thus, I can still hope that a
group with a supermajority of women will generally be less
corrupt than one with a supermajority of men, but the evidence
does not yet justify that conclusion.121
On the other hand, the study does demonstrate that there is
a positive correlation between lack of corruption and a roughly
equal number of men and women participating in a business.122
While we cannot yet be certain what that finding means, it does
suggest additional questions. For example, since women are part
of the larger community, as well as of the smaller communities
within a public corporation, we should seek to determine whether
corruption would in fact be reduced if each relevant community
possessed a balance of men and women. A reduction in
corruption would be consistent with other studies concerning the
effects of diversity on the board,' 23 but what should be the
practical result if the study's suggestion is borne out by further
evidence? The easy answer is that boards of directors and
employment pools should both approach an equal distribution of
male and female participants. Also, they should presumably
seek out other forms of diversity while always ensuring that each
subgroup has a critical mass.124
Consider one additional wrinkle. If essentialist thinking is
too rigid and, instead, gender is to some significant degree
socially constructed, 125 then attenuation of gender differences
will reduce gender effects-both positive and negative. Because
the boundary between the corporation and the rest of society is
porous, the anti-corruption effects of diversity apply only when
120 See Mukherjee & Gokcekus, supra note 52, at 339.
121 See id. at 337-39
122 See id.
123 See supra note 74 (concerning founder-entrepreneurs of developed-country
public corporations).
124 See O'Connor, supra note 72, at 1306-11 (discussing social psychology's
insights concerning diversity on the board, including the requirement that thediversifying subgroup be large enough to be self supporting).
125 See, e.g., SONYA ANDERMAHR, TERRY LOVELL & CAROL WOLKOWITZ, ACONCISE GLOSSARY OF FEMINIST THEORY 182 (1997) (asserting that the "whole
gender order... is socially constructed").
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society creates the diversity--creates a source for the different
experience and perspective. Thus, to the extent that elite status
un-genders women in the professional context, having an equal
number of women and men in positions of authority will not
reduce corruption. On the other hand, to the extent that
diversity does exist as a social reality, its anti-corruption effects
apply equally to corporate and to political governance.
CONCLUSION
This comparative analysis provides us in the developed
world with three new points of view from which to consider
public corporations and their impact on businesswomen. It
invites us to look at the similarities in the situations of women
owners, executives, and employees, crossing for the purpose the
artificial boundaries perpetuated by our compartmentalized legal
categories. It asks us to analyze whether our society derives
appropriate and sufficient benefits from having authorized an
entire regime for the raising of capital. And as a related point, it
reminds us that corporate governance, like the role of women and
public corporations, is but a small part of a much larger political
debate.
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